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CORPORATE PLANNING 
VERSUS GOVERNMENT PLANNING 
The widespread use of planning techniques in private business has led 
many observers to draw parallels to government planning. Senator Jacob 
K. Javits, a leading advocate of national economic planning, has stated 
that "if corporations are to take a look at where their companies are 
heading, it seems appropriate for the government to do the same." 
Well, yes-and then again, maybe. It all depends on what is meant by 
''planning," which can connote a variety of different things, depending 
upon the context. 
Talk about "corporate planning" and "government planning" in the 
same breath disregards the fundamental distinction between members of 
a society forecasting and reacting to the future, and the government of 
that society trying to regulate or control it. Corporate planning is 
necessarily based on the corporate purpose, which is to attempt to 
persuade consumers to buy a firm's goods or services. Activities aimed 
at implementing the plan are in the main internally directed-for 
example, toward improving products, sales techniques, investment 
practices, or other aspects of a company's operations. In striking con-
trast, the government is sovereign, and its planning ultimately involves 
the use of its power to achieve the results it desires. Its influence is 
externally oriented, extending its sway over the entire society, including 
redistributing the resources of that society through taxation, regulation, 
subsidization, and procurement. Unlike a private organization, govern-
ment may not only plan, it can also command. While a business firm 
can set goals only for itself, government can establish goals for society 
as a whole. 
It may be useful to take a closer look at the options open to govern-
ment to effect a particular goal. If the government decides that the 
American public is not buying enough cars, several courses of action are 
available. It can lower the price for the consumer through tax reductions 
on the automobile industry. Or it can reduce the individual income tax, 
thereby increasing the consumer's purchasing power. Or it can subsidize 
the private manufacture of automobiles, or even purchase outright the 
total output of the automobile industry. In recent years, the government 
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has clearly demonstrated a willingness to involve itself in the production 
of motor vehicles, at least to the extent of deciding by fiat many aspects 
of their design and operation, through safety and environmental regula-
tions. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, sponsor of the major national 
planning bills, has made the point vividly: 
What can government do about it? Government can do a lot about it. For 
example, the size of automobiles, and consequently energy consumption, can 
be influenced a great deal by taxing cubic displacement, horsepower, or weight. 
A tax will slow down purchases of large cars and give a premium to small car 
buyers and buyers of cars with high fuel efficiency. Government can also 
influence industry by giving an investment tax credit to companies that produce 
fuel-efficient automobiles. These are just two ways in which government policy 
can influence the private economy. 
In contrast, what can Ford, General Motors, or Chrysler do if they are 
not selling as many automobiles as planned? They can-within their 
available resources-lower the price (and their profits), change the nature 
of their product, or alter their marketing efforts. Or as evidenced by the 
demise of the Edsel, the LaSalle, and the DeSoto, at times they may be 
forced simply to abandon the project. The consumer remains the ulti-
mate decision-maker as to both the number and kind of automobiles 
produced. 
Business and government planning are further distinguished by the 
consequences of errors in planning. If a corporate plan proves inaccurate 
in its assessments of the future, or inappropriate to changing circum-
stances, the onus falls on the officers, employees, and shareholders of 
that company. Government planning, by contrast, focuses on "guiding" 
or "influencing" the activities of the entire nation. If things go wrong 
in public sector planning, the taxpayer and consumer will bear the brunt 
of the burden of any adjustments that result. 
Another basic difference between business and government planning 
relates to the intellectual dimensions of the effort. Corporate plans, 
concentrating in detail on individual sectors of the economy and on 
factors likely to affect their industry, are relatively succinct. Corporate 
executives can and do read and understand them. Government planning, 
on the other hand, necessarily focuses on all economic sectors and their 
interrelationships. In the words of Wassily Leontief, who has provided 
much of the intellectual leadership in the current drive for national 
planning," A national plan would look like the statistical abstract of the 
United States." That abstract, published annually by the United States 
Department of Commerce, contains in the neighborhood of 900 pages 
of fine print and tables. In fact, Professor Leontief is too modest. After 
Congress completed its deliberations on such a comprehensive plan, it 
would likely be two or three times as long. And how many members of 
Congress would then comprehend the overall intent or implications of 
the plan they were to approve? 
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But whether they would understand it or not, they would have set in 
motion powerful forces. Advocates of national planning have denied that 
they would set specific goals for General Motors, General Electric, or 
General Foods. But what if the activities of these companies in the 
aggregate did not further the goals of the plan? Would the results be 
left to chance or to the market mechanism to resolve? Hardly. Proponents 
of national planning state that the planning office "would try to induce 
the relevant industries to act accordingly." As Senator Humphrey has 
described the long-range economic planning section of the Humphrey-
Hawkins bill: 
... it provides a way for us to look at particular industries and sectors and see 
what kinds of objectives and policies we ought to establish in those sectors. This 
will enable us to understand and manage the supply side of the economy much 
better [our italics]. 
Even a cursory examination of the literature on American business 
planning shows that private planning is intended to be far more than 
improved information accumulation and analysis. Although definitions 
developed by individual scholars vary, most are variations on the theme 
that the planning process encompasses an evaluation of the future 
through the determination of desired objectives, the development of 
alternative courses of action, and the selection from among these 
options. In Long-Range Planning for Business, David Ewing offered 
perhaps the most terse assessment of the concept: "Planning is to a 
large extent the job of making things happen that would not otherwise 
occur." 
The proponents of centralized government planning do not leave the 
matter in doubt. They clearly state, "The heart of planning is to go from 
information to action." They go on to indicate, in the words of the 
Initiative Committee for National Planning, that "in order to be effective 
and useful, an Office of National Economic Planning must be set up at 
the center of our most influential institutions." General Motors is 
certainly such an institution. 
Planning Experience in Business 
Postwar business planning has generally undergone two distinct phases, 
although many corporations have not yet made the transition to the 
second phase. The first was essentially an extension of long-range 
budgeting and sales forecasting. Past and present performance was 
simply extrapolated into the future on the basis of rather rudimentary 
techniques. The implicit underlying assumption was essentially passive-
that business would respond primarily to current market forces rather 
than attempt to influence future developments. 
The second phase is more activist in outlook. It seeks to identify the 
major issues and options facing the corporation in the future and to 
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indicate possible new courses of action. It is basically predicated on the 
belief that the pace of technological and environmental change is more 
rapid now than in the past, and that information about change is now 
more available. 
With the rapid growth of planning staffs, planning documents, and 
planning personnel, what has been the impact on the companies them-
selves? In practice how significant have the planning efforts turned out 
to be? Frankly, there are few objective measurements of this essentially 
subjective activity, and the experience among companies varies widely. 
However, we can benefit from the comments and evaluations provided 
by thoughtful observers of the business planning process. Their analyses 
have often yielded unfavorable prognoses for corporate planning. 
In his classic study of long-range business planning, David Ewing 
concluded, "The paradox is that the planning movement, despite such 
strong motives to make it succeed, has not generally been blessed with 
success. The triumphs have been stunning-but few." In his summary of 
the state-of-the-art, Robert J. Mockler concurs with this evaluation, 
reporting that relatively few companies have developed effective plan:-· 
ning operations-although many have tried. These evaluations tend to 
be in accord with a detailed survey made a decade ago of planning in 
· the government-oriented defense industry: 
... inquiries were made into the role that formal planning plays in the corporate 
strategy decisions that determine the future posture of the firm. The responses 
suggest the limited role that planning does play in corporate decision-making. 
Corporate executives tend to rely more on their trends and future activities ... 
The executives frequently stated that their decisions are not made from within a 
detailed planned structure. As one officer put it, they must rely on "taking 
advantage of opportunities rather than having a deep plot" to achieve successful 
results in their business.1 
In specific instances, however, effective and respected planning 
systems have provided positive contributions to the executive decision-
making process in the corporate sector. Their widespread and expanding 
use provides indirect testimony to the credibility of the planning 
process. It is difficult, however, to find an unambiguous illustration-to 
label any specific business planning operation as "successful" on the 
basis of objective criteria. For example, the establishment and extension 
of a sophisticated planning operation in a rapidly growing company may 
primarily reflect the fact that the company operates in a growth market 
and that its profitability enables it to finance a variety of staff services, 
of which a planning staff is but one among many. Also, the key product 
and investment decisions may have been made independently of the 
1 Murray L. Weidenbaum and A. Bruce Rozet, Potentia/Industrial Adjustments to 
Shifts in Defense Spending (Menlo Park, California, Stanford Research Institute, 
1963) 1 p, 20. 
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formal planning process. Thus the "success" of a specific corporate 
planning effort cannot be inferred from the overall performance of the 
organization. 
George Steiner has identified four factors that he considers especially 
significant in the evaluation of the effectiveness of a corporate planning 
system: 
1. The system has improved the quality of management. 
2. The company has acquired a larger share of the market in which it does 
business, and this can be traced to the long-range planning system. 
3. The company has had high and rising sales and profits over a period of time 
that can be attributed to long-range planning. 
4. Sales growth, profit margins, return on investment, and per-share earnings 
are higher than average in the industry, resulting partly from the long-range 
planning process. 
Our review of the literature on business planning has not revealed any 
systematic attempt to apply these or similar criteria to specific efforts. 
For example, the planning program of General Electric (GE) is often 
cited as a model to be followed. The company's Strategic Business Unit 
produces long-range plans that look 10 to 15 years ahead, with compre-
hensive predictions of economic, social, and political trends, and evalu-
ations of their implications for the company. Central to the methodolo-
gy is the concept of "alternative futures." Planning is based on the most 
probable scenario, but the impact on the plan if one of the "alternatives" 
occurs is also analyzed. 
If accuracy of predictions is a measure of success, then GE has evi-
dence of some accomplishments in specialized areas, such as social trends 
and developments. For example, early studies allowed the company to 
get a head start in the areas of minority and women's rights. (GE's 
guidelines for affirmative action were published a year before the 
federal government's.) But it is also possible that GE's planning model 
does not deserve the credit. GE's "success" could simply result from 
employing shrewd and perceptive individuals in its executive staffs. 
Corporate Constraints 
It may be useful at this point to take a look at factors that have 
limited the success of business planning. Some of these may be limited 
to the private sector. Others may be more universal, and overcoming 
them in the public sector may be even more difficult. 
The first set of problems encountered in business planning relates to 
the process itself. The business planner has often been viewed as work-
ing in a vacuum, acting more as a sounding board for management than 
as a participant in the decision-making of the organization. Consider how 
much more serious the consequence would be if the government planner 
worked in a vacuum isolated from political reality. However, if the 




would cease to have "planning," but rather the political management of 
the economy. 
A second area of difficulty involves integrating the concerns and 
priorities of the senior executives of the corporation with the planning 
system itself. Without this integration, the plan will neither be accepted 
nor utilized by other members of the corporation. Consider then the 
problems of the government planner, who must try to integrate the 
goals of 200 million citizens, including tens of thousands of private-
sector managers and decision-makers! One finds it hard even to imagine 
what such "integration" might involve. 
The planning effort is also frustrated by the predispositions of many 
corporate decision-makers. Planning is by definition oriented to the 
future. But as Dale H. Marco, of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, and Company 
states, many companies "really don't pay much attention to the 
future .... They react to history-history that is anywhere from one 
day to a few centuries old." Will politicians react any differently? 
Advocates of national economic planning who base their case on an 
extension of business planning activities overestimate the general state-
of-the-art in the private sector. A study of 13 large, technically oriented 
manufacturing companies found that most of the output of long-range 
planning groups was more in the nature of scheduling programs with 
long lead times, rather than the development of long-range business 
plans. The study concluded that typical long-range plans contained ex-
cessive amounts of trivia, such as monthly delivery schedules, the re-
cruiting budget, square foot~ge of storage space by type, and so on. 2 
In part, this may help to explain why business plans often have a limited 
input into the decision-making process. 
Despite these shortcomings, many American business firms continue 
to engage in formal long-range planning efforts, and they apparently 
believe that the benefits exceed the costs. A variety of reasons is given, 
not all of which may be applicable to or desirable in the public sector. 
Many company managements state that planning is a powerful instru-
ment for tightening organizational discipline and control. Others contend 
that planning can be used to lend authority and plausibility to the 
corporate leader-a chief executive officer with a formal plan projects 
the image of having the enterprise well in hand. His counterpart who 
still relies on intuition and the proverbial "back of the envelope" may 
be at a psychological disadvantage. 
The corporate planning operation also produces information useful to 
management, but this involves an important "opportunity cost." The 
manpower and other resources devoted to the planning effort are un-
available for other purposes. Thus because of the high cqst of a planning 
2 Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Shortcomings of Business Planning," in Subhash Jain 
and Surendra Singhvi, editors, Essentials of Corporate Planning (Planning Execu-
tives Institute), 1973, p. 31. 
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department and because the output often has not met the expectations 
of management, many companies have scaled back their planning efforts. 
To some degree this may have been the natural pattern of reaction and 
accommodation to the overselling of a new management activity (al-
though certainly one with more durability than a short-term fad). Yet, 
at least one major corporation no longer uses the word "planning" in 
any corporate title, or to describe any corporate activity. 
It is also important to recognize the numerous feedbacks to private 
planning that increasingly result from changes in public policy. Some 
analysts expect that a major trend in corporate planning will involve the 
increased role of social values and goals in the private decision-making 
process. George Steiner, for example, foresees the convergence of 
government and corporate planning in specific areas such as pollution 
control. One company cannot undertake massive expenditures to avoid 
pollution if its competitors do not do likewise. As a consequence, busi-
ness executives who never anticipated cooperating with the government 
are now requesting that uniform standards be established for an industry 
so that all companies are required to act. If this level of cooperation 
between business and government indeed becomes more widespread, it 
may substantially reduce the pressures for central planning. That will 
especially be the case if this cooperation coincides with an increased 
responsiveness of business to consumer and societal concerns. 
Planning Experience in Government 
Government experience with formal long-range planning systems 
appears to be more negative than the experience of the private sector. 
The most pertinent evidence available on the effectiveness· of planning 
at the federal level is the experience with the process instituted by Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson. In August 1965, he announced with great fan-
fare the introduction of "a very new and very revolutionary system of 
planning and programming and budgeting throughout the vast federal 
government, so that through the tools of modern management the full 
promise of a finer life can be brought to every American at the lowest 
possible cost." 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) was initially 
greeted with great enthusiasm. For a while it created a land-office busi-
ness for the services of economists, statisticians, and program analysts. 
Some enthusiasts at the time described PPBS as the most significant 
management improvement in the history of our government. The 
August 1965 announcement did have a substantial history behind it. 
Since January 1961, Secretary of Defense RobertS. McNamara and 
Assistant Secretary Charles J. Hitch had been attempting to apply the 
principles of program budgeting to the Pentagon, notably the five-year 
projections of force structures and budgets[ as well as the review of 
budget submissions along program lines, rather than merely organiza-
tional lines. 
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Some of the enthusiastic overreactions to the implementation of 
PPBS were perhaps inevitable, and not fundamentally different from 
private sector experiences. It takes many years, not the mere months of 
President Johnson's timetable, to establish an effective planning system, 
public or private. The intent of PPBS was to provide better information 
for the development of both budgets and legislation, but that was not 
the initial result. The government was already turning out thousands of 
analyses, evaluations, and studies every year. It became instead a dif-
ferent, somewhat competitive channel for decision-making; its influence 
on policy was often negligible. The PPBS apparatus has now been large-
ly dismantled in the federal government. What remains is performed in 
a more modest manner, as part of the annual budget preparation. 
In retrospect, it is quite clear that PPBS-at either the Pentagon or 
White House level-did not help the federal government avoid either 
fundamental overcommitments, at home or abroad, or an unusual array 
of "crises." Those who blithely assume that the occasional"success" 
of business planning can be readily replicated at the national level should 
consider the failure of the Edsel in the private sector, and the major 
federal decisions made at the peak of the PPBS enthusiasm-deeper 
American involvement in the Vietnam War and the over-promotion of 
the "Great Society" domestic programs. The point is not that the 
attempts to introduce organized planning led to these failures, but rather 
that they clearly did not prevent them. David Ewing offers a stronger 
conclusion: II For sheer magnitude of fiasco, however, business cannot 
compete with planners in the military and government." 
In view of the impact of more formidable planning systems, such as 
the one utilized in Great Britain, perhaps we should be pleased that the 
results of PPBS were mainly paper shuffling and wheel spinning. Many 
analysts of Britain's experiences with centralized planning have painted 
a rather dismal picture, characterizing its economic woes as largely the 
result of giving the State responsibility for so many crucial economic 
decisions. 
Government planning in France also extends beyond forecasts of the 
economy, at first by indicating directions, following with persuasion, 
and then resorting to direct action. In his analysis of the French planning 
experience, John Sheahan cites a different type of problem-the possibili-
ty of large private corporations coming to dominate the government 
planning process. This would be an extension of the widely held 11Cap-
ture" theory, whereby regulated industries increasingly influence the de-
cisions of the government agencies set up to oversee them. Planning by 
consultation and negotiation in France may be tending to drive the 
government planners into such a close alliance with business interests 
that the planning board becomes a champion of the firms which it finds 
it easiest to deal with. Since these are usually the largest businesses, 
government planning thus weakens competition and may result in the 
neglect of social concerns. 
8 
The overall economic performance does not appear to have improved 
under any of these alternative schemes of national economic planning 
adopted by the primarily market-oriented, non-Communist nations. 
These planning systems have tended to shift the focus of private enter-
prise even further away from dealing with market forces and consumer 
demands, toward reaching an accommodation with an ever more power-
ful governmental bureaucracy. 
Under an American version of centralized economic planning, a 
company might find it desirable to shift resources from conventional 
marketing activities to convincing the government to adopt more gener-
ous production targets for its industry. Thus there might be less payoff 
from traditional consumer market research than from new efforts to 
persuade the government to treat the industry more favorably. In this 
regard, we could conjure up visions of civilian companies following some 
of the practices of that branch of American industry, defense produc-
tion, which is now most closely tied to governmental decision-making. 
Business-financed hunting lodges and fishing trips for civilian govern-
ment planners might seem merely to follow an older defense industry 
tradition, but such public sector "marketing" activities would be a 
low priority use of business resources. Yet, given the incentive of any 
organization to grow and prosper in the environment it faces, this result 
would not be surprising under a system of strong national economic 
planning and centralized decision-making. 
Managing the Government 
In a sense, there are two types of government planning that need to 
be distinguished. The external, national planning discussed above in-
volves numerous extensions of government powers over the private sec-
tors of the economy. A second type of government planning is more in-
ternally oriented, and may be more comparable to private sector plan-
ning: the management of government's own activities. The advocates of 
national planning tend to merge the two, using shortcomings in govern-
ment's management of its affairs as a rationale for extending government 
power and influence over consumers and business. 
In his far-ranging statement advocating national economic planning, 
Senator Humphrey deals in passing with this second type of government 
planning: "We don't have any economic impact statement for govern-
ment decisions. The government goes around willy-nilly making decisions 
of consequence ... the manner in which we are presently utilizing 
government resources and government agencies is a haphazard, helter-
skelter enterprise." It would appear, however, that a government con-
ducted on such a haphazard, helter-skelter basis should be reluctant to 
undertake the extremely ambitious task of managing the entire economy 
prior to setting its own house in order. This is perhaps an appropriate 
point to turn to that task. 
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The federal government presently has an instrument for establishing 
its priorities and allocating its resources, though it is neither new nor 
the object of widespread public attention-the budgetary process. To be 
~ure, there are serious limitations to the way it currently works. Despite 
Important reforms, government budgeting rarely addresses itself to the 
fundamental question of selecting overall priorities. Instead, the major 
attention of decision-makers focuses on the amount of funds to be al-
located to a specific agency, or to an individual project within an agency. 
Little if any consideration is given to alternative ways of achieving such 
overall objectives as reducing inflation, increasing employment, and im-
proving living standards. 
In striking contrast, the adoption of a government-wide program 
planning budget would be a useful tool for improving decision-making. 
Expenditure categories would cut across agencies and would relate to 
the various programs and activities that serve a given purpose. For ex-
ample, program budgeting would necessitate making deliberate choices 
among alternatives: The job training programs of the Labor Department 
the tax incentives to employers administered by the Treasury Depart- ' 
ment, and the economic development subsidies paid out by the Com-
merce Department would all be viewed as alternative ways of achieving 
a higher level of employment. In a very real sense, a measure of compe-
tition would be introduced into the process of allocating governmental 
resources. 
The underlying rationale for this suggestion for program budgeting 
is evident in the activities of a well managed company. Such a company 
would not impulsively decide to devote an increase in earnings to raising 
the aividemd rate. Rather, it would carefully consider the alternative uses 
of the funds-embarking on a new research program, rebuilding an ob-
solescent manufacturing plant, or developing a new overseas operation. 
The basic requirement is the ability to array the pertinent alternatives, 
each seemingly attractive in its own right, and to choose carefully and 
intelligently among them. 
Although proposals for a national economic planning system may be 
designed by economists and other technical specialists, it will be politi-
cians and representatives of powerful interest groups who will translate 
any proposal into reality. They will oversee and perhaps guide the ac-
tivities of the planning body and subsequently use its output. But as has 
too often been the case in the past, the results of such an undertaking 
may not conform to the initial expectations of its proponents. 
M_ost of t~e p~blic discussion of national planning focuses on the po-
tential contnbut1ons to the solution of such macroeconomic problems as 
inflation and unemployment. However, a centralized planning apparatus 
c?ul~ be.redirected toward effecting basic changes in, for example, the 
d1stnbut1on of income among the various groups of the society. As 
interest groups recognize a new mechanism for introducing change on a 
10 
national scale, attempts to make such shifts in economic power would 
not be unlikely. This may occur even though it was neither a desired nor 
an expected result of the planning system. 
It would not be unusual for economic analysis to be applied to justify 
politically desirable programs-examples include many Corps of Engi-
neers, Bureau of Reclamation, and other "pork barrel" projects. In each 
case, detailed economic calculations are made in order to comply with 
the statutory requirement that measured benefits exceed measured costs. 
Yet, in practice, many of these projects represent an uneconomical use 
of national resources, resulting mainly in national subsidies to specific 
regions. 
In a different regard, the issue of an unfair distributi®n of govern-
mental resources is already a major source of debate. There is a growing 
concern in the Northeastern "frost belt" over the large shares of federal 
money going to the Southwestern 11Sun belt." Could a national planning 
mechanism become an arena for either resolving or intensifying this 
regional conflict? The latter would be the case if the emphasis in allo-
cating resources shifted from establishing program priorities to altering 
the regional distribution of those resources. 
Possibilities for Planning 
Both advocates and opponents of expanding government's role in 
planning can agree that any effort to deal with the future has built-in 
limitations. For example, no amount of formalized planning has elimi-
nated any company's uncertainty concerning future technological 
change, the vagaries of the weather, discoveries of energy or other natur-
al resources, outbreaks of war, assassinations of national leaders, or even 
shifts in the desires of the fickle consumer. And there seems to be no 
basis for assuming that government planning efforts would be more accur-
ate or effective than those of business. If anything, national planning 
introduces a new range of problems. It is certainly conceivable that the 
bureaucratic process inevitably involved would tend to dilute or possibly 
redirect the original objectives. Carl Madden has offered cogent words of 
caution concerning planning efforts: II ••• just as the process of planning 
stimulates acts of envisioning new possibilities, so the existence and pro-
mulgation of a plan constrains such acts. A plan is a device that inhibits 
further imagining." 
The possibilities of using business planning experiences to mold a na-
tional planning system are not encouraging. Even disregarding the short-
comings of many business plans and planning techniques, the differences 
between business and government decision-making are fundamental. 
Business planning is based on the traditionally implicit-and increasingly 
explicit-assumption that the ultimate decisions on the allocation of 
society's resources are to be made by individual consumers. The impor-
tant corollary of this is that if a company's projections are wrong, it will 
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suffer the consequences. National planning by government, implicitly or 
explicitly, is based on a fundamentally different set of assumptions. 
Government officials, both appointed and elected, will determine what 
they consider to be in the overall interest of society. If the public does 
not respond accordingly, it is not the planners who are considered to be 
at fault. Rather, new and more effective devices will be employed to in-
duce the pub I ic to accommodate the planners' conception of the good 
(or great) society. 
Boiled down to its essence, business planning is part of a decentral-
ized decision-making process in which individual consumers make the 
ultimate choices. National planning is a centralized process in which the 
key economic decisions are made in the form of governmental edicts. 
The greatest danger of adopting a form of centralized economic plan-
ning is that it will-perhaps unintentionally at first, but inevitably as its 
initial results prove disappointing-propel the society away from market 
freedoms and toward greater governmental controls over individual 
behavior. 
But despite the polarized nature of much of the public debate, the 
controversy over national planning really does not involve choosing 
between "master" planning and no planning at all. It is apparent that 
a great deal of planning goes on in the United States, in both the public 
and private sectors. The crux of the current debate involves deciding 
who should plan for whom. There is no question about the authority 
and desirability of General Motors planning its own activities. Likewise, 
upon reflection, it may be equally desirable for the Department of 
Transportation to plan its own activities. The point at issue is whether 
the Transportation Department, or any other federal agency, should 
plan the activities of General Motors-or its suppliers, employees, and 
customers. 
There may be some high ground-although not necessarily a middle 
ground-to which the antagonists in the debate can both move, at least 
for a while: a position related to the need for improving the ability 
of both government and business to plan-and manage-their own af-
fairs. In the Road to Serfdom, Friedrich von Hayek develops this point: 
The dispute between the modern planners and their opponents is .... not a dis-
pute on whether we ought to employ foresight and systematic thinking in plan-
ning our common affairs. It is a dispute about what is the best way of so doing. 
The question is whether for this purpose it is better that the holder of coercive 
power should confine himself in general to creating conditions under which the 
knowledge and initiative of individuals are given the best scope so that they can 
plan most successfully; or whether a rational utilization of our resources requires 
central direction and organization of all our activities according to some 
consciously constructed "blueprint." 
This article draws upon material in The Politics of Planning, Institute for Con-
temporary Studies, 1976. 
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